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The use of the three labels (logicism, formalism, intuitionism) to denote the three foundational schools of the 
early twentieth century are now part of literature. Yet, neither their number nor their adoption has been stable 
over the twentieth century. They were not introduced by the founding fathers of each school: namely, neither 
Frege nor Russell spoke of ‘logicism’; and even Hilbert did not use the word ‘formalism’ to introduce his 
foundational programs. At a certain point, only Brouwer used the label ‘intuitionism’ in his scientific 
production to personify his philosophy of mathematics and he used the label ‘formalism’ for Hilbert’s 
foundational viewpoint. Starting with Brouwer, the origin of the use of the three labels to represent a 
foundational meaning, will be analysed in this paper.  Thereafter, the role that Brouwer’s pupil Arend Heyting 
had in the production and use of foundational labels will be considered. On the basis of the comparison of the 
attitudes of these two scholars I will finally advance the thesis that not only the creation but also the use of 
labels, far from being a mere gesture of academic reference to literature, can be a sign of the cultural operation 
each scholar wanted to do. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we will see the role and the attitude that Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer and Arend Heyting have 
had in the production and use of the three foundational labels (logicism, formalism, intuitionism) after a very 
intriguing series of events. It begins with Brouwer’s dissertation (1907). Brouwer used the labels at hand in 
the ‘foundational market’ (i.e. those mentioned in the mathematical/philosophical journals by Cantor, 
Poincaré, Hilbert, Couturat, Russell), such as: ‘axiomatics’, ‘Cantorianism’1 and ‘logistics’ (as proposed by 
Couturat). We do not find ‘logicism’, because this foundational label only appeared in 1928, nor do we find 
intuitionism, because Brouwer had not chosen any for his viewpoint.  
 
2. Brouwer’s thesis 
In his Ph. D. thesis, Brouwer analyzed2 the various foundational approaches starting from his own: which was 
the correct one and the differences that lay in it explained the failure of all the other approaches. He began with 
an analysis of his viewpoint about mathematics: it consisted of mental constructions and was independent from 
logical laws, although it ‘is expressed in the form of argumentation, deduction of properties, by means of a 
chain of syllogisms’. Even proof by contradiction (reductio ad absurdum) requires a construction, namely one 
begins a construction (according to the definitions expressed in the theorem) which at a certain point can no 
longer go; even in this case, one observes something, he does not think of a law: ‘I simply perceive that the 
construction no longer goes, that the required structure cannot be imbedded in the given basic structure. And 
when I make this observation, I do not think of a principium contradictionis’ (CW I, p. 73). 
 After such mental constructions are performed, there can be the will or the need to describe them to other 
people so that they themselves can build something analogous and, by looking at the linguistic expression of 
mathematical constructions, it is possible to discover a regularity in the combination of words: ‘Here a 
                                                     
1 To be more precise, ‘axiomaticians’ and ‘Cantorians’. 
2 About Brouwer’s thesis see van Stigt 1990, pp. 35–43. 
mathematical system is projected and the man calls such sentence an application of a logical law’ (CW I, p. 
75). The mathematical study of this part of mathematical language is called by Brouwer ‘theoretical logic’. 
The mathematical study of the whole of mathematical language is ‘the content of logistic’. It can be traced 
back to Leibniz but it has been fully developed ‘in the last twenty years’ (CW I, p. 74). Both theoretical logic 
and logistic are considered by Brouwer as empirical sciences as they are applied mathematics, and for this 
reason they do not give us any information about the organization and functioning of the human intellect: 
‘There would be better reason to reckon them under ethnography than under psychology’. Moreover, ‘The idea 
that by means of such linguistic structures we can obtain knowledge of mathematics apart from that which can 
be constructed by direct intuition, is mistaken’ (CW I, p. 75). 
On this basis, he began to analyse the various foundations of mathematics of his time: 1) foundations on 
axioms, 2) Cantor’s transfinite numbers, 3) the Peano-Russell logistic, 4) the logical foundation after Hilbert. 
The first field concerned recent researches by Pasch, Schur, Hilbert, Peano, Pieri and pointed out some 
‘failings’ within Euclidean geometry: axioms are tacitly introduced here and there. However, Brouwer 
stigmatized that their targets were not Euclidean imperfections, but pathological geometries. They constructed 
linguistic structures and required proof of consistency, but nobody proved that consistency was a sufficient 
condition to exist mathematically. 
The second field that Brouwer considered was Cantorianism, that he criticized because ‘Cantor loses contact 
with the firm ground of mathematics’ (CW I, p. 81) in his definition of the second number class.3 In particular, 
in the concept of ‘den Inbegriff aller’ he mentioned something which cannot be thought of, for a totality 
constructed by means of ‘and so on’ could only be thought of if ‘and so on’ refers to an ordertype  of equal 
objects, and this was not the case.  
Then he focuses on Peano and Russell’s treatment of logic. Brouwer saw it as an attempt to put a remedy on 
the fact that classical logic is inadequate for mathematics (CW I, p. 89):  
The logisticians, considering the propositional functions as the free origin of logic and mathematics, 
utter as such various sentences which are built in (falsely presumed) analogy to mathematical properties, 
and they postulate that these sentences define classes and that it is allowed to reason about these classes 
according to the laws of classical logic.  
Brouwer also affirmed (CW I, p. 88):  
But in the intellect one cannot give a linguistic system of statements and propositional functions priority 
over mathematics, for no assertions about the external world can be intelligently made besides those that 
presuppose a mathematical system that has been projected on the external world.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that they, like the Cantorians, collided against contradictions. As for the extension 
of classical logic represented in ‘logistics’ by the logic of relations, Brouwer stated  (CW I, p. 90): ‘It is self-
evident that in the language which accompanies mathematics, the succession of words obeys certain laws, but 
to consider these laws as directing the building up of mathematics, it is therein that the mistake lies’.  
The conclusion that he drew about logistics was that it was not suitable as foundation of mathematics because 
it was separate from mathematics. The best to which it could aim was being a faithful stenographic copy of 
the language of mathematics ‘which itself is not mathematics but no more than a defective expedient for men 
to communicate mathematics to each other and to aid their memory for mathematics’ (CW I, p. 92). 
Thereafter he turned to Hilbert, who gave ‘the most uncompromising conclusion of the methods we attack, 
which illustrates most lucidly their inadequacy’ (CW I, p. 92). In particular, Hilbert aimed at achieving 
consistency proofs for various parts of mathematics. He aspired to start from nothing and to develop 
                                                     
3   Brouwer (CW I, p. 81) quoted Cantor’s definition: 
Wir definiren die zweite Zahlenklasse als den Inbegriff aller mit Huelfe der beiden Erzeugungsprinzipe (he means 
by those principles: add one unit and: take for an ordertype w the next higher element, the limit-element) bildbaren, 
in bestimmter Succession fortschreitenden Zahlen: ω, ω + 1, ω + ω+ …+ ω+  ω
welche die Bedingung unterworfen sind, dass alle der Zahl  voraufgehenden Zahlen, von 1 an, eine Menge von 
der Mächtigkeit der ersten Zahlenclasse bilden. 
mathematics and logic together, but he intuitively applied all the laws of logic and even complete induction 
(CW I, p. 93). Furthermore, the consistency of the linguistic system, deduced by means of the mathematical 
intuition, did not prove the mathematical intuition. Finally, he stressed that Hilbert was even more open to 
criticism than ‘the logicians’ because in his works there was list of confusing stages:4 
1. Construction of intuitive mathematical systems 
2. Mathematical speaking or writing (the expression of 1) 
3. The mathematical study of language: ‘we notice logical linguistic structures, raised according to principles 
from ordinary logic or through the logic of relations’. 
4. Forgetting the sense of the elements of the logical figures in 2. and imitating the construction of these 
figures by a new mathematical system of second order. 
5. The language that may accompany 4. 
6. The mathematical study of language 5.  
7. Forgetting the sense of the elements of the logical figures in 5. and imitating the construction of these 
figures by a new mathematical system of third order. 
8. The language that may accompany 7. 
In each paragraph of Hilbert’s ‘Über den Zahlbegriff’ (1900a) he pointed what stage Hilbert referred to exactly, 
and when he jumped from one stage to another. 
Brouwer believed that Poincaré criticized both logistics and Cantorianism, by blaming the petitio principii in 
the former and the reference to the actual infinite in the latter. According to Brouwer, Poincaré only dealt with 
the surface of the matter and not the core, hereby the confusion between the act of constructing mathematics 
and the language that accompanies it. Poincaré did not found mathematics on construction.  In particular, he 
wrote (CW I, p. 96): ‘Le mathématiques sont indépendantes de l’existence des objets matériels; en 
mathématiques le mot exister ne peut avoir qu’un sens, il signifie exempt de contradiction’. 
It is important to underline that in Brouwer’s dissertation, Frege was not mentioned. In the first volume of 
Brouwer’s Collected Works, on p. 568 in the footnote Heyting, as the editor, stated: ‘Brouwer seems not to 
have known Frege’s work. He has never mentioned it’. Kuiper (2004, p. 223) stated:  
 
That Brouwer was at least familiar with some of Frege’s work and can be concluded from the following: 
in the first place, he attended the lectures by Mannoury who discussed Frege’s work on the foundations 
of mathematics; (cf. Mannoury 1909, Vorwort and page 78 ff.); secondly, Brouwer referred on one 
occasion in notebook5 8 to an article by Frege in the Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker 
Vereinigung number 12, Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie II, in which Frege 1903 reacted on 
Hilbert’s book with the same title.6 In his Synopsis of the notebooks Brouwer again referred to the 
relevant paragraph in notebook 8.  
   
Nevertheless, Brouwer believed that Russell not Frege was his target in ‘logistics’. Kuiper stressed that in 
1907, Frege 1884 and Frege 1893 were both available at the University of Amsterdam library according to 
information acquired by the University Library (Kuiper 2004, p. 223). Frege’s work was neglected by 
mathematicians of that time, presumably because the symbolism he used was rather forbidding, and Russell’s 
influence was far greater and hence he was often read instead. 
 
 
3. Around 1912 
In 1908, in the article where he criticized the principle of the excluded middle, Brouwer referred to 
foundational schools by stating that recent paradoxes created skepticism in the free use of logic in mathematics, 
therefore some mathematicians abandoned the idea that logic is presupposed in mathematics and tried to build 
                                                     
4 Brouwer stated that, even if it were possible to go further on, it would be senseless, because the mathematical systems 
of higher orders would simply be copies of these. 
5 Brouwer’s notebooks are now available at: http://www.cs.ru.nl/~freek/brouwer/ with a transcription by John Kuiper. 
6 Hilbert 1899. 
both sciences in parallel by using ‘the methods of logistics, founded by Peano’ (CW I, p. 108). He concluded 
by stating that the basic intuition of mathematics was unavoidable, and we should attain to what can be 
developed from it, but he did not coin a label for his viewpoint. 
It was only in the 1911 review of the Mannoury volume Methodologisches und Philosophisches zur Elementar-
Mathematik that Brouwer suddenly introduced (CW I, p. 121) the contrast between intuitionism vs formalism 
(it wasn’t in Mannoury’s book)7:  
[…] the author defends the ‘formalist’ concept, which has also been advocated by Dedekind, Peano, 
Russell, Hilbert and Zermelo, against ‘intuitionists’ like Poincaré and Borel for instance. This formalist 
concept recognizes no other mathematics than the mathematical language and it considers it essential to 
draw up definitions and axioms and to deduce these other propositions by means of logical principles 
which are also explicitly formulated beforehand.  
After defining formalism, Brouwer wondered what could have been the reason for accepting those axioms and 
mentioned Russell’s answer which was to verify the logical existence of mathematical entities and Hilbert’s 
answer which was  to verify the logical figure of ‘contradiction’ that could not be derived by the axioms.8 He 
ended by emphasizing that both Russell and Hilbert could not do without ‘the intuitive application of complete 
induction’ and therefore ‘they have invigorated by their reasoning rather intuitionism than formalism’ (CW I, 
p. 121). Furthermore, he added that Mannoury could criticise intuitionism because he only had Poincaré’s 
version of it, and this produced two weak points: the rejection of every infinite number, including the 
denumerable, and the identification of mathematical existence with non-contradictoriness. Brouwer was sure 
that ‘it is only after these mistakes have been redressed, and after the basic intuition of two-ity has been 
accepted, that intuitionism becomes invulnerable’ (CW I, p. 122). In Mannoury’s book two opposite viewpoints 
about mathematics are described:  Kantianismus and Symbolismus.. ‘Thus, the question arises how Brouwer 
came to employ these names’, Hesseling affirmed (2003, p. 53). He presented three possible explanations for 
the label ‘intuitionism’: 1) Brouwer coined the term influenced by Kant, Schopenhauer and Poincaré; 2) he 
took the term from Felix Klein or Henri Bergson; 3) he got the term from morality theory (such  use was 
supported by Clausberg and Dubislav 19239). As for the label ‘formalism’, Hesseling (2003, pp. 52–53) 
stressed that ‘Frege […] argued strongly against Thomae’s views, using words such as “formal” and “formal 
arithmetiker”, but he did not call Thomae’s view “formalism”’. Nor do we know if Brouwer actually knew 
anything about such dispute. Hesseling concluded (2003, p. 54):  
Whatever the origin of the names may be, it is a fact that in the 1920s people involved in the foundational 
debate saw the terms ‘intuitionism’ and ‘formalism’ as coined by Brouwer. Bernays, looking back at the 
                                                     
7 Mancosu 1998, p.180 was the first to notice that Brouwer’s introduction of the two labels had taken place in 1911 (and 
not in 1912, in his first academic lecture, as its title would suggest); Hesseling 2003, p. 52 specified that the labels came 
from Brouwer himself and not from Mannoury’s book, as the review could suggest.  
8 As for Mannoury, Brouwer said that his formalism was untenable, but he justified his criticism through his own point 
of view about mathematics. Indeed, he stated that Mannoury had based the choice of axioms on psychology, but ‘like 
every science of experience psychology presupposes mathematics at least up to the first infinite cardinal number inclusive’ 
(CW I, p. 121). 
9 The two authors proposed a classification of ethical theories according to the question they intend to answer, i.e. the 
question about the origin of ethical norms and the question about the essence of ethical norms. ‘Intuitionism’ was a kind 
of answer to the first question (it was a nuance of the empiricist answer to that question), defined as follows: ‘eine Lehre 
der Ethik heißt “nativistische” oder ‘intuitionistische’, der zufolge die ethischen Normen angeboren und nicht erworben 
sind’ (1923, p.161). Hesseling found this innatism very similar to Brouwer’s primordial intuition. Furthermore, the 
Clausbeg-Dubislav definition of formalism, like Brouwer’s one, intended as a way of proceeding without attention to the 
content of involved concepts. Therefore, Hesseling seemed to be inclined toward this explanation: ‘The strong point in 
this explanation is that not only accounts for Brouwer’s choice in the name of intuitionism, but also of formalism’ (2003, 
pp. 54–55). Yet, he added: ‘However, I have not found any explicit reference to intuitionism in ethics in Brouwer’s 
writings’ (2003, p. 54). 
It is interesting to point out that also the label ‘logicism’ appeared in the Woerterbuch. 
debate from the 1970s, even claimed that all three terms – intuitionism, formalism and logicism – 
originated from Brouwer.  
In order to consider the matter in detail, we must mention Felix Klein’s first Evanston lecture (1893, p.2) where 
he placed mathematicians in three main categories: logicians, formalists and intuitionists:  
the word logician is here used, of course, without reference to the mathematical logic of Boole, Peirce, 
etc.; it is only intended to indicate that the main strength of the men belonging to this class lies in their 
logical and critical power, in their ability to give strict definitions, and to derive rigid deductions 
therefrom.  
He quoted Karl Weierstrass as an example. Then, he stated that the formalists mainly excelled in the formal 
usage of a given question, ‘in devising for it an “algorithm”’. He used Paul Gordan, Arthur Cayley and James 
Sylvester as examples. Finally, he wrote (1893, p. 3): ‘To the intuitionists10 belong those who lay particular 
stress on geometrical intuition (‘Anschauung’), not in pure geometry only, but in all branches of mathematics. 
What Benjamin Peirce has called ‘geometrizing a mathematical question’ seems to express the same idea’.  
Lord Kelvin and Karl von Staudt were examples. We see that the labels ‘formalism’ and ‘Intuitionism’ are 
coined but their meanings are different to Brouwer’s ones. 
In his book, Mannoury introduced the contraposition Kantianism/Symbolism in the index (1909, p. 262), in 
the third group of topics in the first chapter (of the second part of the book) about mathematical logic: ‘Kritik 
des Symbolischen Logik; die Beurteilung der Widerspruchslosigkeit der logischen Formeln; Kantianismus und 
Symbolismus’. In the inner pages of the book we find ‘Kantianismus’ as committed mainly to Poincaré, 
defined as ‘der talentvolle Wortführer des Kantianismus in der Mathematik’ (1909, p. 144). The authors quoted 
on the opposite side were Giuseppe Peano, Louis Couturat and Hilbert. ‘Symbolismus’ was explicitly named 
(1909, p. 149) as a ‘Werkzeug’ for a better understanding of judgements, when Mannoury expressed his own 
opinion about non-contradictoriness of formal systems. In particular, Mannoury believed in the impossibility 
of individuating elements both inside nature and inside consciousness: they are continuous. More specifically, 
every element of consciousness is in infinite ways related to former elements (remembrances) and to future 
elements (expectations). Only on a conventional level (with an aimed target) can we decide to point out 
elements and the special relationships between them. Language could help us, on a conventional level to keep 
our elements fixed. Therefore, mathematics, with its unities, had no intrinsic exactness, but unity could be an 
arbitrarily chosen element of consciousness. Hence, mathematics was founded on psychology. The stability of 
mathematics was better sustained by forms of language that have strong stability, i.e. symbolic language. 
Consequently, Mannoury, among symbolism and Kantianism, was a symbolist, but on a realistic level (he 
referred both to Hegel and Nietzsche): mathematics was a human product, containing only relative truths, i.e. 
truths relative to human purposes and languages.11  He specified that non-contradictoriness was not the 
warranty of mathematical certainty, of mathematical absolute truth, because truth/falsity are always relative,12 
the task of explaining why we are so averse to contradictory systems belongs to psychology.13 In a footnote 
                                                     
10 In his sixth lecture, on the purpose of intuition of space, Klein wrote (1893, p. 46):  
Finally, it must be said that the degree of exactness of the intuition of space may be different in different 
individuals, perhaps even in different races. It would see as if a strong naïve space-intuition were an attribute pre-
eminently of the Teutonic race, while the critical, purely logical sense is more fully developed in the Latin and 
Hebrew races. A full investigation of this subject, somewhat on the lines suggested by Francis Galton in his 
researches on heredity, might be interesting. 
11 Heijerman 1990 p.267 defines Mannoury’s position as ‘formalistic, materialistic, psychologistic and pragmatic’. 
12 On this subject see Heijerman 1990. 
13 In 1917 Mannoury adhered to the Signific movement (and its related analysis of language). This determined a certain 
evolution towards intuitionism. Significs was defined by Mannoury (Heyting 1934, p. 290) as ‘the theory of mental 
associations which underly human speech acts’ and a speech act is every act with which people try to influence each 
other’s conduct. Mannoury concentrated on verbal speech acts. He accepted Brouwer’s opinion that all linguistic 
expressions are verbal imperatives, but he distinguished two kinds of speech acts, according on how much the satisfaction 
of the speaker depends on the willgness (or unwillingness) of the hearer to ‘obey’. When satisfaction depends on this, the 
speech act represents an expression of willingness; otherwise it is an informative or indicative speech act. The signific 
(1909, p. 152) Mannoury said that among other (unnamed) Kantianer was Aurel Edmund Voss, according to 
what he sustained in his 1908 lecture ‘Über das Wesen der Mathematik’. In particular, Voss defended ‘die 
“höhere” Bedeutung der Mathematik, dem Formalismus gegenüber’. Therefore, the label ‘Formalismus’ for 
the enemies of the ‘Kantianismus’ was in that footnote. Thus, it could have been a direct source for Brouwer’s 
choice of labels.  We could imagine that Brouwer decided to change the label ‘Kantianismus’ for his 
foundational school in order to point out the originality of his own opinion (even though he admitted his ‘debt’ 
towards Kant). Since the intuition of two-ity had been used by him as the key for granting the invulnerability 
of his opinion, it seems reasonable that he used the label ‘intuitionism’, even though it had a different meaning 
in Klein’s work. Then, once he had decided to change the core of the two labels (i.e. Kantianism), it was natural 
to change the other (symbolism), which was more ‘unstable’ inside the book and had already been substituted 
by ‘formalism’ in a footnote.  
In 1912, in his introductory lecture ‘Intuitionism and Formalism’, Brouwer stated that there were two main 
points of view that founded the exactness of mathematics: ‘The question where mathematical exactness does 
exist, is answered differently by the two sides; the intuitionist says: in the human intellect; the formalist says: 
on paper’ (CW I, p. 125). He traced an old form of intuitionism back to Kant, but also added that Kant’s 
intuitionism was weak. It became more realistic when he abandoned apriority of space and built mathematics 
only on intuition of time. Brouwer described formalists as scholars starting from the theory that exact images 
of straight lines or of large numbers (numbers larger than three, for example) are not available to reason. Then 
they concluded that such entities ‘do not have existence in our conception of nature any more than in nature 
itself’, but they based their non-mathematical conviction of legitimacy of their systems on the efficacy of their 
projection into nature (CW I, p. 125):  
For the formalist, therefore, mathematical exactness consists merely in the method of developing the 
series of relations […] And for the consistent formalist these meaningless series of relations to which 
mathematics are reduced have mathematical existence only when they have been represented in spoken 
or written language together with the mathematical-logical laws upon which their development depends, 
thus forming what is called symbolic logic.  
In order to be sure of the consistency of the language that they used, formalists avoided daily language and 
introduce new ones. Peano is labelled as a formalist, his symbolism is criticized as something that can only be 
read by a few of the initiated (CW I, p. 126). According to Brouwer, intuitionists and formalists agreed on 
finite sets: in that field the two differ solely in their method, not in their results. On the contrary, when infinite 
sets are considered, ‘the formalist introduces various concepts, completely meaningless to the intuitionist, such 
as “the set whose elements are the points of space”, “the set whose elements are the continuous functions of a 
variable”, etc.’ (CW I, p. 130). Brouwer ended his lecture by stating that he saw no chance that an agreement 
in a finite period could be reached. He quoted Poincaré: ‘Les hommes ne s’entendent pas, parce qu’ils ne 
parlent pas le mȇme langue et qu’il y a des langues qui ne s’apprennent pas’ (CW I, p. 138). 
 
4. Brouwer in 1927 
 
1927 was the year of Brouwer’s Berliner Gastvorlesungen. In 1991 van Dalen published Brouwer’s 
manuscripts of lessons (Brouwer 1991). The same structure can be read in the postwar years, when Brouwer, 
after a long pause caused by his falling out with Hilbert (see van Dalen 1990), began to publish and lecture 
around the world. In the first chapter on ‘Historische Stellung des Intuitionismus’, he distinguished three 
                                                     
meaning of each speech act consists of the associations complement those acts. Associations resulting from observations 
are the indicative elements of the meaning; associations which relate to impulses and affects are the emotional elements 
of the meaning. Furthermore, there are volitional and formal elements. Mannoury built a hierarchy of linguistic levels, on 
the basis of an increasing stability of word connection. The application of this analysis to mathematics led Mannoury to 
see the possibility of a distinction between indicative and emotional elements also in mathematics:  the indicative meaning 
of mathematical theorems consists of the knowledge of formerly constructed formalisms; the emotional meaning is the 
value we assign to mathematical speech act (an aesthetic value, a ‘sportive value’ etc.). 
periods: 1) the first, which lasted until the 19th century, was characterized by the belief of the existence of 
properties of time and space, independent from language and logic, and was called by Brouwer (1991, p. 19) 
‘Kantian viewpoint’:  
 
Bis weit in das 19. Jahrhundert hinein hat man an die Existenz einer aussersprachlichen, und 
ausserlogischen, Mathematik der Zeit und (unabhängig davon) des Raumes geglaubt, deren Exactheit 
man aber jedenfalls in einem grösseren wissenschaftlichen Lehrgebäude nur so aufrechterhalten könnte, 
dass man einige […] empfundene Wahrheiten sprachlich registrierte und in dieser Weise exakt festlegte 
und sich dann […] mittels der vier aristotelischen Spezies14 zu einer Theorie […] erhob.  
 
2) The first period finished as a result of non-Euclidean geometry and the theory of relativity that ended the 
belief of the Kantian theory of space and allowed mathematics to be based on the theory of numbers. Therefore, 
the second period is characterized (1991, p. 20) by the arithmetization of geometry which was enhanced by 
the important role that was played by logic in this process (in linking the mathematical propositions):  
 
haben die altformalistische Schule (Dedekind, Peano, Russell, Couturat, Hilbert, Zermelo) dazu 
ermutigt, den kantischen Standpunkt vollständig aufgeben, und bis auf einen (aussersprachlichen) 
Zweckmässigkeitsanlass, alles aussersprachliche und ausserlogische aus der Mathematik 
auszuschalten). 
 
Meanwhile, the pre-intuitionistic school (Kronecker, Poincaré, Borel, Lebesgue) was ‘ganz anders orientiert’ 
(1991, p. 20):  
 
Es hat für die Konstruktion der natürlichen Zahlen und das Prinzip der vollständigen Zahleninduktion 
den deskriptiven kantischen Standpunkt beibehalten, der eine von Sprache und Logik unabhängige  
Exaktheit postuliert, also der Widerspruchsfreiheit ohne logische Beweis a priori sicher ist: für die 
Einführung des Kontinuums hat die den Mut dazu gehabt. ‘Das gegebene’ mathematische Kontinuum 
entsprach nicht einer aussersprachlichen, mithin ausserlogischen intuitiven Konstruktion, sondern 
wurde auf Kosten der ausserlogischen Existenzsicherheit eingeführt […] Weil diese prä-
intuitionistischen Überlegungen teilweise nicht auf anschauliche Empfindung beruhen, genügen sie 
weder der korrektiv-kantischen noch der deskriptiv-kantischen Forderung. 
 
Brouwer also underlined that pre-intuitionism continued to apply logic (including the principium tertii exclusi) 
confidently, even after the discovery of logical antinomies. 
The new-formalistic school belonged to the same period and was represented by Hilbert, Bernays, Ackermann 
and von Neumann. At the end of this period the existence of natural numbers and the non-contradictoriness of 
their theory was based ‘aussersprachlig’; on the contrary, a linguistic proof of non-contradictoriness of the 
theory of the continuum is looked for, presupposing a trust on the four Aristotelian logic principles (‘Spezies’). 
3) The third period was characterized by the two acts (Handlungen) of Intuitionism. The first ‘Handlung’ is 
described as follows (1991, p. 21):  
                                                     
14 Here Brouwer meant the four logical principles. In ‘Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache’ (CW I, p. 422) he listed 
the principles one by one: the principles of identity, syllogism, contradiction, excluded third. In his thesis, in the part 
devoted to ‘propositional functions and classes’ (CW I, p. 88) he stated: ‘We safely apply the principles of identity, 
syllogism, distribution, contradiction and tertium non datur’. Therefore, he listed five principles (there was also the 
principle of distribution). In 1908 he named the principles of contradiction, excluded third, and syllogism: the principle 
of identity was missing. In the 1905 text ‘Sur l'utilité de la logique algorithmique’ (which is printed with this title), 
presented at the 1904 Philosophy Congress in Geneva, Couturat emphasized that logistics had allowed to clarify which 
the principles of logic were. There was, in fact, no single principle – that of identity – from which others could be deduced, 
but there were four principles: identity, contradiction, excluded third, and syllogism, each independent of each other and 
each having two senses – one related to the concepts and one related to the statements. I suppose there was an influence 
of this paper on Brouwer’s lists of logical principles. About this question see also van Atten and Sundholm 2017, p. 26. 
 
 Die rückhaltslose Loslösung der Mathematik von der mathematischen Sprache und dementsprechend 
von der sprachlichen Erscheinung der theoretischen Logik. Die intuitionistische Mathematik ist eine 
vom menschlichen Geiste vollzogen sprachlose Konstruktion die sich in restloser Exaktheit entwickelt 
aus der Ur-intuition der Zwei-Einigkeit.  
 
Brouwer explained his criticism of the principle of the excluded middle and the doubts stemming from such 
criticism: were the ‘fruchtbare, überabzählbare, fertige Spezies’ of the continuum-theory to be ‘deklassiert’ 
‘zu einem inextakten Ausläufer der beschreibende Naturwissenschaften?’ (1991, p. 23). In particular, it was 
based on logic, which was no longer trustable. The answer came from the second ‘Handlung’, consisting in 
the self-exploiting of the ‘Ur-intuition’. The book was committed in explaining that Handlung. 
 
Brouwer maintained the two labels that he had already introduced (formalism vs intuitionism), by adding a 
Kantian viewpoint that in the 1912 lecture simply belonged to ‘intuitionism’ and that in his final works will 
disappear. Furthermore, he distinguished two standpoints in each label: an old (or pre-) and a new one. As van 
Dalen remarked (1991, p. 9), in his works before 1927, Brouwer defines his own intuitionism as ‘neo-
intuitionism’. This label was present also in the first draft of the lessons, but the prefix ‘neo’ was cancelled by 
the author. In Brouwer’s later papers his intuitionism will always be called ‘intuitionism’, while Poincaré and 
Borel’s viewpoint will be considered as ‘pre-intuitionist’. Van Dalen stressed that a good amount of self-
consciousness was already present in Brouwer’s early scientific years in the choice of a label (‘new-
intuitionism’) that defined the position of only one person in the world. Nevertheless, in 1927 Brouwer’s ‘self-
consciousness’ had become greater. In particular, he used ‘intuitionism’ for his opinion and ‘pre-intuitionism’ 
for the French school: by doing so Brouwer could highlight that his intuitionism was the end point of a finalized 
path, and not a variant of an already existing school. 
 
5. Brouwer in 1928 
1928 was an abundant year for Brouwer’s works. He published the paper ‘Intuitionistische Betrachtungen über 
den Formalismus’ and held two lectures in Vienna (published resp. one and two years lately). 
5.1.‘Intuitionistische Betrachtungen über den Formalismus’ 
In his 1928 ‘Intuitionistische Betrachtungen über den Formalismus’ Brouwer went on with his ‘duel’ against 
formalism and listed four viewpoints that the intuitionists asserted and that he was sure that, sooner or later, 
also formalists would share: this would mark the end of the ‘Grundlagenstreit’ and from that time on, the 
choice between formalism and intuitionism would only be ‘a question of taste’. The four viewpoints mentioned 
were: 
1) The formalists’ aim to build a formal image of mathematics while they also have an intuitive theory of the 
laws of such a construction. Namely, they admit that intuitionistic mathematics of the integers is indispensable 
for their intuitive theory. 
2) The refusal of a blind application of the principle of the excluded middle, which has a sure validity only for 
finite domains. 
3) The identification of the principle of the excluded middle with the principle of the solvability of every 
mathematical problem. 
4) The knowledge that justifying formalistic mathematics through the proof of its non-contradictoriness 
contains a vicious circle: it is founded on the law that allows to move from the double negation to the 
affirmation; but this law is based, at its turn, on the principle of excluded middle. 
Before giving counterexamples to the principle of the excluded middle (interpreted intuitionistically), Brouwer 
stressed that formalists had not concluded anything as far as the certainty of mathematics was concerned, while 




5.2. ‘Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache’ 
In ‘Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache’, Brouwer pointed out the difference between pure mathematics 
(developed out of the intuition of the duo-unity) and the mathematical observation of the world (i.e. the 
application of mathematics to the sensible world); then, he mentioned the language that comes after the 
mathematical construction (it cannot be used to develop mathematics itself). He mentioned the formalistic 
school (CW I, p. 422) and declared that its fault resided in its belief in classical logic. The origin of such belief 
consisted in the fact that their laws were trustable when they were referred to finite domains. But this 
trustworthiness led men to a superstitious faith in the miraculous power of language: there was no need of 
checking whether there was a reality corresponding to an assert logically derived from some axioms. Their 
derivability was itself a warranty of existence. Among philosophers this attitude led them to consider as ‘ideal 
truths’ concepts that contradicted the perceptual data. If some doubts about the deduction leading to such 
falsities were risen, then a modification of axioms was proposed: logical laws were never touched. 
Mathematicians did the same: they applied logical laws to infinite domains without hesitations and produced 
ideal truths ‘welche von den Mathematikern mehr als leere Worte gehalten wurden’ (CW I, p. 424). When they 
crashed against the contradictions produced by an unlimited application of the axiom of comprehension, at 
first they tried to re-arrange the axioms and, when that failed, they tried ‘widerspruchsfreie Neugestaltung der 
mathematischen Sprache’ that required only limited ‘Amputationen’ in mathematics. Here the intuitionists 
contrasted the formalists once again: intuitionists destroyed confidence in logical laws when applied to infinite 
domains by giving counterexamples to the validity of the principle of the excluded middle in those domains 
and criticized formalists for building a linguistic castle instead of a mathematical building.  
5.3. ‘Die Struktur des Kontinuums’ 
 ‘Die Struktur des Kontinuums’ was devoted to explaining the novelty of Brouwer’s work of the continuum 
through the exploitation of the duo-unity in terms of lawless sequences. In order to do this, Brouwer pointed 
out the different approaches to the continuum in recent history of mathematics. The partition among schools 
was expressed as follows: his opinion was called ‘intuitionist’; then there were formalists (stemming from 
Dedekind, Peano, Russell, Zermelo and Hilbert) who only paid attention to mathematical language and  
avoiding the production of contradictions in the theorization of the continuum; and old-intuitionists (stemming 
from Poincaré and Borel) for whom only the denumerable part of the continuum had a content, i.e. could be 
built by constructive means starting from the intuition of the duo-unity, while for the more-than-denumerable 
continuum the reference to a linguistic source is necessary. 
In 1928 Brouwer had a terrible argument with Hilbert, described in van Dalen 1990. Hilbert re-founded the 
Mathematische Annalen to cast him off the editorial committee. Although the other editors tried swallow the 
bitter pill, Brouwer felt very hurt. From 1930 to 1948, he stopped his publications, except for a few minor 
ones. 
 
6. Logicism as a label at the horizon: its philosophical precursors 
(Wundt, Groos, Ziehen, Clausberg and Dubislav) 
Before being part of the literature of foundations of mathematics, the term logicism appeared, in different 
occasions, in philosophical texts at the beginning of the 20th century by Wilhelm Wundt, Karl Groos, Theodor 
Ziehen, Johannes Clausberg and Walter Dubislav. 
6.1 Wilhelm Wundt 
The term ‘Logizismus’ appeared in 1910 in Wundt ‘Psychologismus und Logizismus’. He stated that the two 
terms were new with respect to the intended use. They represented two views about philosophy, and in this 
sense they were as old as philosophy itself:15  
Versteht man unter Psychologismus diejenige Tendenz in der Philosophie der Gegenwart und der 
jüngsten Vergangenheit, die in der psychologischen Analyse des Inhalts der Erfahrung die wesentliche 
Aufgabe der Philosophie erschöpft sieht, so ist es klar, daß er nur einen Versuch darstellt, die gesamte 
Philosophie und damit die Wissenschaft überhaupt auf die reine Erfahrung, wie sie in den unmittelbaren 
Tatsachen unseres Bewußtsein enthalten ist, zurückzuführen. Im Gegensatz dazu würde dann der 
Logizismus der Versuch sein, umgekehrt, auf dem Weg der logischen Reflexion über den 
Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen, insbesondere auch derer, die uns im eigenen Bewußtsein gegeben 
sind, Rechenschaft abzulegen […] Der eine dieser Standpunkte ist der deskriptive,  der andere der 
explikative.   Beide widerstreiten sich nicht, sondern sie verbinden sich in dem Sinne, daß zunächst eine 
beschreibende Analyse die genaue Kenntnis der Tatsachen zu vermitteln pflegt, ehe eine Interpretation 
ihres Zusammenhangs oder, nach der üblichen Bezeichnung, eine ‘Erklärung’ stattfinden kann. 
6.2. Karl Groos 
In 1912 Karl Groos, analysed some forms of dualism in philosophy and their solutions, he saw in Cohen’s 
statement: ‘Die Empfindung ist letzlich nichts anderes als eine Fragezeichen’ (1912, p. 270) a certain approach 
to a radical logicism. Furthermore, when presenting two methods to analyse the knowledge (das Wissen), he 
pointed out ‘eine psychologische Betrachtung’ contraposing to ‘eine logische Betrachtung’ (1912, p. 270):  
Die Methoden des Psychologen haben es mit den realen, zeitlich fließenden Bewußtseinsinhalten des 
erlebenden Individuums zu tun […] Der Logiker löst seine Gegenstände von dem Konnex mit dem 
erlebenden Subjekt ab und verwandelt sie in ideale Gebilde, die der Zeit enthoben sind.  
Finally, he defined ‘naiven Logizismus’ that ‘der sich den logischen Gegenständen gegenüber genau so 
unkritisch verhält wie der naive Realismus den Naturobjekte gegenüber’ (1912, p. 271).                
6.3. Theodor Ziehen 
In 1914 Theodor Ziehen, who had inherited the label ‘Logismus’ for Edmund Husserl’s anti-psychologistic 
logic16 from Ludwig Busse,17 changed18 it into ‘Logizismus’ by defining it as follows (1914, pp. 30–37):   
                                                     
15 (http://www.gleichsatz.de/b-u-t/begin/wundt/wu-psylog1.html). 
16 As he himself mentioned (1920 p. 173n) in a kind of history of the word ‘Logizismus’, François Viète used ‘logistic’ 
for Rechenkunst and algebra (‘Logistice numerosa est quae per numeros, speciose quae per species seu rerum formas 
exhibetur, ut pote per alphabetica elementa’ – Viète 1691, p. 5). Later, Wilhelm Traugott Krug used it for Rechenkunst 
and Syllogism (‘Logistik ist eigentlich Rechenkunst. Doch wird es auch zuweilen fuer Syllogistik oder Schlußkunst 
gebraucht, weil  ebensowohl eine Rechnung als einen Schluß bedeutet’ – Krug 1833, p. 746). In the 20th century, 
Louis Couturat (with Itelson and Lalande, as reported in his 1905 recollection of the international congress of philosophy) 
and Alexius Meinong (‘”symbolischen Logik”, fuer die sich der Name “Logistik” mit Recht durchzusetzen scheint’ – 
Meinong 1907, p. 115), restricted the term ‘logistic’ to indicate ‘algebra of logic’. L. Busse used the term ‘Logismus’ for 
Edmund Husserl’s anti-psychologistic logic in a 1903 review of the Logische Untersuchungen (1903, p. 153):   
In dieser Hinsicht ist nun vor allem hervorzuheben Husserls Abschwenken vom Psychologismus, den er in seiner 
Philosophie der Arithmetik vertreten hatte, zu einem Standpunkte, den man als Logismus oder als 
transzendentalphilosophischen bezeichnen kann. 
Ziehen mentioned Wundt in other parts of the book for other purposes, but he did not quote Wundt on this purpose (see 
Peckhaus’ remark: at http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/glossary/logicism.htm). 
17 See Ziehen 1913, p. 411. 
18 He specified: ‘Die Bezeichnung “Logizismus” statt “Logismus” schließt Verwechslungen noch sicherer aus’ (1914, p. 
31). In 1920 (p. 173 n) he stressed that he had changed the label because ‘Logistik’ had been used in France for a long 
time to mean algebraic logic. In the same place he mentioned Groos’ use of ‘Logizismus’ as follows: ‘Auch K. Groos 
verwendet die Bezeichnung “Logizismus” ähnlich wie ich’. It seems that Ziehen wanted to attach himself the priority at 
least for the autonomy in choosing such label. 
Zwei Richtungen der Erkenntnistheorie sind es namentlich, die in diesem Sinn den rekonstruierenden 
Standpunkt von der Empfindungswelt ganz oder fast ganz loslösen, eine ältere, die man gewöhnlich als 
Rationalismus bezeichnet, und eine neuere, die jener nahe verwandt ist, aber doch in der übertriebenen 
Hervorhebung des logischen Standpunktes von ihr abweicht und im Hinblick auf diese Eigentümlichkeit 
als Logizismus bezeichnet werden kann. […] Für den Logizisten sind die logischen Begriffe und Urteile 
nicht ein kleiner Teil des Gegebenen, dem nur die Bedeutung der Zusammenfassung von anderem 
Gegebenen zukommt, wie von der genetischen Erkenntnistheorie gelehrt wird, sondern sie haben – 
wenigstens zum Teil – eine Stellung ausserhalb des Gegebenen und über dem Gegebenen. 
In 1920 he kept the word ‘logicism’ from an epistemological viewpoint (among other, independent, five ones), 
opposed to the ‘psychologisch-sensualistisch-induktive Richtung’. According to him, logicism affirmed the 
existence of a ‘rein Logisches’ in addition to the Tatbestand and to the Denkergebnis (1920, p. 172):  
der Satz, daß außer den Empfindungen und den aus ihnen hervorgegangenen Vorstellungen […] als 
Grundlage anzunehmenden Dingen an sich das Logische in irgendeiner Weise eine eigene, 
selbstständige Existenz hat, also gewissermaßen neben den psychischen Vorgängen der Empfindungen, 
der Vorstellungen und des Denkens und neben den  Dingen an sich […] ein drittes Sein darstellt.  
The authors Husserl and Bolzano were contemplated. Furthermore, also Windelband and Rickert as the 
representatives of a so-called ‘Werttheoretischer Logizismus’.19 Finally, Lotze and Teichmüller are labelled as 
‘semi-logicists’, because both of them affirmed the existence of ‘das Logische’, but they didn’t explain how. 
Ziehen also expressed his opinion about logicism. He stated that it had started from a right idea, i.e. the 
distinction between logic and psychology that is to say that logic looked for the correct thought and not for its 
effective development. Still, logicism was wrong because it separated logic and psychology and ‘das Logische’ 
was seen as a third domain: ‘[…] das Logische ganz vom Psychologischen loslöst und als ein ganz besonderes 
Reich deutet, das ebensowohl von den Dingen (Dingen an sich usw.) wie von den psychischen Vorgängen 
ganz unabhängig ist’ (1920, p. 258).20 As for Frege and Russell, Ziehen mentioned them with the label 
‘Mathematical logic’ and saw a link with logicism only for the fact that ‘some logicists’ considered the general 
set theory as a part of pure logic (1920, p. 228).21 
6.4. Johannes Clausberg and Walter Dubislav 
In 1923 the Wörterbuch mentioned above was published by Clausberg and Dubislav. We have already seen 
that they presented the label ‘Intuitionismus’. Our attention must be focused on the other label they introduced, 
i.e. ‘logicism’. The first entry in which the label appeared was ‘ethics’, as a kind of answer to the question 
about the essence of ethical norms (1923, p. 161): ‘Eine Lehre der Ethik heißt eine ‘logizistische’, der zufolge 
                                                     
19 In particular, Rickert was seen near to logicism because he considered as distinguished the two worlds called resp. 
‘Welt der seienden’ and ‘Welt der geltenden’ (that the subject keep linked though his judgements). Still, logic is this 
second world, therefore ‘das Logische existiert nicht, sondern es gilt’ (Ziehen 1920, p. 190). 
20 Ziehen stressed the following aspects: 1) it is impossible to obtain ‘materiale Aufschlüsse’, independent from 
experience, through a mere analysis (‘Zergliederung’) of a concept (for instance, it is impossible to get to synthetic a 
priori knowledges through the analysis of the concept of ‘experience’); 2) it is useless to add a ‘third’ (‘das Logische’) to 
individual perceptions and to the things in themselves. It remains undefined and without examples. Even logicists do not 
agree with the ‘Seinsweise’ of logical objects; 3) the complete separation of das Logische from das Psychische is never 
complete. The logicist believes that this is possible only because he confuses das Psychische and das Psychologische 
(1920, p. 262). 
21 In 1914, p. 38 he wrote: 
Die mathematische Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, die von den Logizisten gern als Beispiel einer ‘rein-logischen’ 
Leistung angeführt wird, ist durchaus keine reine Logik. Soweit sie mehr ist als blosse Zeichenlehre und formale 
Logik, soweit sie also nicht lediglich gewisse Worte und Zeichen im Interesse eines eindeutigen und konstanten 
Gebrauchs definiert und die sich aus diesen Definitionen ergebenden formal-logischen Konsequenzen zieht, ist sie 
nichts anderes als Mathematik und wie diese auf Erfahrung gegründet.  
It is clear that Ziehen used the label ‘Logicism’ as a general approach to the theory of knowledge (and not as a specific 
foundational label for mathematics. At most, according to him, some part of mathematics could be used as an example of 
pure ‘apriori’ by philosophers who liked a logistic methodological approach to knowledge).  
die Widerspruchslosigkeit der Beweggründe des Wollens hinreichende Bedingung für die Sittlichkeit des 
Wollens ist’.  
The second entry was ‘Logik, Mathematik’. Its first meaning was (1923, p. 275):  
Diejenige Wissenschaft, welche darin besteht daß aus einer Gesamtheit als denknotwendig zu 
bezeichnender Sätze sämtliche andere als denknotwendig zu bezeichnenden Sätze begründet bzw. zu 
begründen versucht werden, so wie es in der betreffenden Gesamtheit enthaltene Sätze angeben.  
They specified that ‘logistic’, ‘mathematical logic’ and ‘algebraic logic’ were synonyms of what refers to the 
first meaning of logic. In connection with this meaning, the authors inserted ‘mathematics’ as the ‘totality’ of 
‘pure mathematics’ and ‘applied mathematics’. Finally, they specified that it was possible to consider logic as 
either dependent on or independent from psychology, the theory of knowledge and metaphysics. If one 
believed that logic was presupposed by all the other sciences, then his/her viewpoint had to be called 
‘logizistische’22 (1923, 276).  
Then in 1926 Dubislav23 (alone) presented a tripartite relationship between logic and mathematics referring to 
Russell’s viewpoint (mathematics was completely reducible to logic), Brouwer’s viewpoint (logic was based 
on mathematics) and Hilbert’s viewpoint (logic was independent but mathematics used logical rules in its 
theorems), but without labelling them. In the first issue of Erkenntnis, Dubislav published his ‘Über den 
sogenannten Gegenstand der Mathematik’, where he pointed out four ‘Grundansichten’: ‘1) die Platon-
Kantschen These zuzüglich der intuitionistischen; 2) die empirische These; 3) die konventionalistische These; 
4) die formalistische These wie deren Vorläuferin, die logizistische’ (1930, p. 27). In the first viewpoint, he 
also dealt with Brouwerian intuitionism, by mentioning the author’s distinction between an old and a new 
intuitionism (1930, p. 33). Dubislav saw a common element between all intuitionisms: ‘Ur-intuition’ as the 
basis of mathematics. He described formalism (1930, p. 41) as the statement that mathematics and logic are 
not sciences (‘Wissenschaften’) but calculations (‘Kalküle’) where one could derive, from arbitrary initial 
formulas, other formulas according to certain arbitrary rules of operation. And in the footnote (1930, p. 41) he 
referred to logicism, by distinguishing between ‘der ältere Logizismus’ – represented by Russell – which 
affirmed that mathematics could be restlos reduced to logic and consisted of a system of analytic truths; and 
‘der neuere Logizismus’ – represented by Wittgenstein – which affirmed that mathematics and logic were 
systems of tautologies (i.e. judgements true and a priori) and have nothing to do with reality: ‘Sie sind also 
keine Bilder der Wirklichkeit, sondern vielmehr bedingungslos wahre Aussagen’ (1930, p. 41). This viewpoint 
is confirmed in his 1931 paper and in the 1932 booklet (see also Allen 1933), even though logicism is no longer 
presented as a precursor of formalism.24 
 
7. Logicism as a label in foundations of mathematics: Fraenkel and Carnap 
In the years 1928–1931 the label ‘logicism’ also appeared in the foundations of mathematics thanks to 
Abraham Fraenkel and Rudolf Carnap.  
                                                     
22 They considered the Kantian definition of logic as ‘Die Wissenschaft von der Verstandesregeln’ as the second meaning 
of logic, and Überweg’s definition (‘Logik as Wissenschaft von den normalen Gesetzen der menschlichen Erkenntnis’) 
as a third meaning of the word. The fourth was according to Sigwart (‘Kunstlehre des Denkens, welche die Kriterien des 
Wahren Denkens bestimmen soll’); the fifth was according to Erdmann (‘Wissenschaft von der formalen 
Voraussetzungen des wissenschaftlichen Denkens’); the sixth was according to Wundt (‘soll diejenige Gesetze des 
Denkens festzustellen, die beider wissenschftlichen Erkenntnis wirksam sind’); the last came from Cohen (‘Lehre vom 
Denken, welche an sich Lehre von der Erkenntnis ist’) (1923, p. 279). 
23 About Dubislav see Milkov 2015 and 2016. 
24 Formalism was his favourite viewpoint both in the philosophy of mathematics and in the philosophy of science: 
according to him, not only logic and mathematics were calculi, but also scientific theories were calculi with attached rules 
of interpretations (on this issue see Van Zantwijk 2013, Milkhov 2015 and 2016). 
7.1 Abraham Fraenkel 
In 1928, in his revised edition of Einleitung in die Mengenlehre, Abraham Fraenkel distinguished three 
Begründungsarten of Set Theory: Logicismus, Intuitionismus and Formalismus, by specifying that he preferred 
logicismus. Although he assigned intuitionism the merit for pointing out ‘Lücken’  in the foundations of 
Analysis and Set Theory, Brouwer’s concept of construction seemed too unclear25 for him and he was willing 
to give up classical mathematics only because it showed some misconduct in some of its margins. As for 
formalism, he didn’t believe that such program could succeed, because the value of ‘signs’ didn’t seem so 
crucial in mathematics (1928, p. 383). Furthermore, even if the program were to be successful, and even if its 
focus was only on signs, he didn’t see enough of a reason to define a certain system of axioms to mathematics 
(instead of another), and he didn’t understand how the applicability of such axioms to nature could be possible: 
‘Der Formalismus hat so zwischen der Mathematik und der Welt eine Kluft hervorgebracht, deren 
Überbrückung kaum mehr vorstellbar erscheint’ (1928, p. 384). His preference for the logicism in the sense of 
‘Einfügung der Mathematik in den weiteren Rahmen der Logik’ was not only due to the will that the difficulties 
linked to the reducibility axiom could be solved, but ‘selbst wenn sie es nicht sein sollen’, insofar as the other 
schools were not successful too, he could count this as proof of the limits of human thought regarding such 
questions (1928, p. 384):  
So kann das, solange nicht von anderer Einstellung her ein voller Erfolg zu verzeichnen ist, ebensowohl 
den Schranken des menschlichen Denkens zur Last gelegt warden, über die das hier vorliegende 
Problem hinausgehen mag, wie etwa der Falschheit oder Unzweckmäßigkeit der logizistischen 
Einstellung.  
He appreciated the use of axiomatic method in logicism. He stressed that the three foundations were not ‘scharf 
voneinander geschieden’, but it was possible to put them in a neat list ‘durch eine Reihe möglicher und auch 
tatsächlich vorkommender Übergangsstufen miteinander verknüpft’ and they were not exhaustive: a fourth 
school could be introduced or re-claimed from an old, relinquished perspective. A conciliation among the 
schools was impossible at his days.26 Fraenkel separated ‘logistics’ and ‘logicismus’. He stressed (1928, p. 
263) that the first label was not univocal, because it was used in literature to indicate the formal aspects of the 
new logic that had been developed in the 19th century (algebra of logic, symbolic logic, etc.) and used for the 
foundational point of view. Therefore, he believed that it was better to indicate the foundational school through 
a specific label: ‘Logizismus’.27  
7.2. Rudolf Carnap 
In 1929, in his Abrißder Logistik mit besonderem Rücksichtigung der Relationstheorie und ihrer 
Anwendungen,28 Carnap introduced ‘Logistik oder symbolische Logik’ by stressing that the whole 
mathematics was a branch of it. In a footnote (p. 2) he listed Ziehen (his 1920 footnote on p. 173), Meinong 
(the same quote reported by Ziehen) and the three scholars of the Geneva 1904 symposium29 (Couturat, Itelson, 
Lalande) as those who had proposed the label. Then30 he specified (1929, p. 3) that: ‘Eine philosophische 
Richtung mit starker oder etwa übermässiger Betonung des logischen Gesichtspunktes nennt man nicht 
“logistisch” sondern besser, wie zuweilen schon üblich, “logizistisch”, “Logizismus”’. 
                                                     
25 About the relationship Fraenkel-Brouwer see van Dalen 2000. 
26 He quoted the same Poincaré statement that Brouwer had put at the end of his 1912 paper (mentioned above). 
27 In order to support his remark about the equivocal terminology, he quoted (1928, p. 263) Ziehen (1920, p. 173) and 
Lewis (1918). Charles Irving Lewis presented two different definitions of logistics: an orthodox one and a heterodox one. 
The orthodox view considered logistic as a name for abstract mathematics, developing through logical operations 
represented in the ideographic symbols of symbolic logic (1918, p. 343). The heterodox view considered symbolic logic 
as one inferential system (‘type of order’) among other possible ones, and logistic as the study of the various types of 
order (1918, pp. 354–55). 
28 About this book see Grattan-Guinness 2000, pp. 500–502. 
29 About the Geneva Congress see Grattan-Guinness 2000, pp. 366–368. 
30 He didn’t quote Fraenkel, but Lewis (1918, p. 340), where he had proposed to restrict the use of ‘logistic’ to the method 
of applying symbolic logic to ‘außerlogischen Gebieten’ (Carnap 1929, p. 2). 
Thus, in 1929, he seemed to use ‘Logizismus’ more in a general philosophical sense than with a mathematical-
foundational meaning. Also the following year, in the first issue of the journal Erkenntnis (1930, p. 12) he 
introduced31 the new method of doing philosophy as a logical analysis of the concepts referring to what he 
would later call ‘logicism’ but without using that label. Only in 1931 Carnap introduced, in the proceedings of 
the Königsberg Colloquium, published in the second volume of Erkenntnis, three different foundational 
schools that he labelled resp. as logicism, intuitionism and formalism. The aim of the congress was to make a 
budget of their situation at the beginning of the Thirties. The school that he represented was logicism and he 
pointed out the relationship between mathematics and logic as one of the most intriguing matters concerning 
the problem of foundations. He stated that logicism saw mathematics as a part of logic so that mathematical 
concepts were deducible from logical concepts and mathematical theorems were provable starting from logical 
asserts (1931, p. 94): 
Das wesentliche an der angedeuteten Methode der Einführung der reellen Zahlen ist, da hier diese 
Zahlen nicht ‘postuliert‘, sondern ‘konstruiert‘ werden. Es wird nicht durch Postulate oder Axiome die 
Existenz von Gebilden angesetzt, die die Eigenschaften der reellen Zahlen haben, sondern es werden 
durch explizite Definitionen logische Gebilde konstruiert, die auf Grund dieser Definitionen diejenigen 
Eigenschaften haben, die man in der Arithmetik den reellen Zahlen beizulegen pflegt. Eine 
Begriffsbildung ist nicht eine Erschaffung, sondern nur eine Namengebung für etwas, das als vorhanden 
schon nachgewiesen sein muß; es gibt keine ‘schöpferischen Definitionen’. 
Carnap saw the very problem of logicism in the will of avoiding both the axiom of reducibility and the division 
of real numbers into different orders.  Then, he also looked for similarities among the various schools.32 The 
similarity between logicism and intuitionism consisted in the fact that for both of them no concept could only 
be built on the axiomatic basis. Concepts had to be constructed out of undefined basic properties of a given 
domain according to some rules of constructions in a finite number of steps. The similarity between logicists 
and formalists consisted in the fact that during the deduction in both cases no reference to the meaning of the 
words was considered. 
 
8. Brouwer: the final solution 
We have seen that in his 1927 Berliner lectures Brouwer had introduced the difference between old formalism 
and new formalism. One could expect that in 1931 he could have used Gödel’s results as a weapon against 
formalists, but he did not.  On this purpose, Hao Wang reported (1987, p. 88):  
In the spring of 1961 I visited Brouwer at his home. He discoursed widely on many subjects. Among 
other things he said that he did not think Gödel's incompleteness results are as important as Heyting's 
formalization of intuitionistic reasoning, because to him Gödel‘s results are obvious (obviously true). 
Van Atten 2017 (Sect. 3.5) observed that Brouwer’s reaction to the first incompleteness theorem was 
understandable. Undeniably, it had been Brouwer’s argument that had stimulated Gödel in finding the first 
theorem. As reported in Carnap’s diary note on December 12, 1929, he stated that Gödel spoke about the 
                                                     
31 He added that the new logic, which had its first attempts with Frege, Peano and Schröder, and had been well developed 
by Whitehead and Russell, was essential for this aim: the old one, that was centered around the structure subject-predicate 
could not allow a refined analysis of all concepts because it neglected relations (larger than, near to, etc.) (and in this way 
it supported metaphysical monsters like an absolute subject to which everything would belong as an attribute). Here 
Carnap recalled that the new logic, which had been further modified after the discovery of logical antinomies, allowed to 
obtain all of mathematics out of logical concepts. So, he referred to logicism without using that label. 
32 He worked to find a synthesis of logicism and formalism (see Oberdan 1993). 
inexhaustibility of mathematics and declared to have been stimulated33 into this idea during Brouwer’s lecture 
in Vienna on that day.34 In an alleged paper, Carnap wrote (Wang 1987, p. 50) what Gödel told him:  
We admit as legitimate mathematics certain reflections on the grammar of a language that concerns the 
empirical. If one seeks to formalize such a mathematics, then with each formalization there are problems, 
which one can understand and express in ordinary language, but cannot express in the given formalized 
language. It follows (Brouwer) that mathematics is inexhaustible: one must always again draw afresh 
from the ‘fountain of intuition’. There is, therefore, no characteristica universalis for the whole 
mathematics, and no decision procedure for the whole mathematics. In each and every closed language 
there are only countably many expressions. The continuum appears only in ‘the whole of 
mathematics’[…] If we have only one language, and can only make ‘elucidations’ about it, then these 
elucidations are inexhaustible, they always require some new intuition again.  
According to van Atten 2017, the second incompleteness theorem, on the other hand, must have surprised 
Brouwer, given his ‘optimism’ in the 1920s about the formalist school achieving its aim of proving the 
consistency of formalized classical mathematics. Such optimism appeared in a paper full of counterexamples 
where he described (Brouwer 1924, p. 3, CW I, p. 270): 
We need by no means despair of reaching this goal (of a consistency proof for formalized mathematics), 
but nothing of mathematical value will thus be gained: an incorrect theory, even if it cannot be inhibited 
by any contradiction that would refute it, is none the less incorrect, just as a criminal policy is none the 
less criminal even if it cannot be inhibited by any court that would curb it.   
Brouwer alluded35 to Gödel’s results both in his Cambridge Lectures and in his 1952 paper ‘Historical 
Background, Principles and Methods of Intuitionism’, by stating (Brouwer 1952, p. 508): 
The hope originally fostered by the Old Formalists that mathematical science erected according to their 
principles would be crowned one day with a proof of non-contradictority, was never fulfilled, and, 
nowadays, in view of the results of certain investigations of the last few decades, has, I think, been 
relinquished.  
Yet, Brouwer did not stress the surprising result in order to support his own opinion. I suppose that, since he 
had previously attached no value to the achievement of a consistency proof, the impossibility of achieving it 
however did not appear to him as a relevant point in his argumentation against formalism: the impossibility of 
achieving something useless must have not been particularly interesting for him. By reconsidering the history 
of foundational viewpoints he introduced an evolution of an old period of intuitionism (called ‘observational 
period’ – instead of ‘Kantian period’), and he asserted that the new formalist school, founded by Hilbert, came 
out when the old formalist standpoint ‘had been badly shaken’ by the criticism of pre-intuitionists. They 
stressed out the essential difference between logic and mathematics and an autonomy of the so-called separable 
parts of mathematics from the rest. In his new formalism, Hilbert made use of the intuition of natural numbers 
and of complete induction, and postulated the existence and exactness independent from language only for 
meta-mathematics. Brouwer posed the intervention of (his) intuitionism here, after Hilbert’s new-formalism, 
and depicted the situation ‘after’ Hilbert’s viewpoint in this way (CW I, p. 509):  
The situation left by Formalism and Pre-intuitionism can be summarized as follows: for the elementary 
theory of natural numbers, the principle of complete induction, and more or less considerable parts of 
algebra and theory of numbers, exact existence, absolute reliability, and non-contradictory were 
universally acknowledged, independently of language and without proof. There was little concern over 
                                                     
33 Yet, van Atten and Kennedy 2009, p. 499 stressed that in his theorem, even though inspired by Brouwer, Gödel went 
considerably beyond Brouwer because he gave statements expressible within the axiom system but which may not be 
decided from the axioms. 
34 About the personal contacts between Brouwer and Gödel see also van Atten and Kennedy 2009, pp. 501–503 and van 
Atten 2015, pp. 165–171, 190–191. 
35 On this purpose, van Atten and Kennedy 2009 (p. 499) affirmed: ‘Brouwer never explicitly commented on Gödel's 
theorems in print, but clearly had the (second) incompleteness theorem in mind when he wrote his 1952 paper’. 
the existence of the continuum. Introduction of a set of pre-determinate real numbers with a positive 
measure was attempted by logico-linguistic means, but a proof of the non-contradictory existence of 
such a set was lacking. For the whole of mathematics the rules of classical logic were accepted as reliable 
aids in the search for exact truths. 
In this situation, his intuitionism intervened through his two famous acts. In the first, he separated mathematics 
and logic, and based mathematics on the languageless activity of mind having its origin in the perception of 
time. In the second he recognized the possibility of producing: 1) the infinitely proceeding sequences of 
mathematical entities (previously acquired); 2) mathematical species, i.e. properties supposable for 
mathematical entities previously acquired.36 Then, Brouwer described the main results of his theory of the 
continuum (for instance, his fan theorem), and he did not add anything else about the other schools. 
We have seen that Brouwer presented the point of view of  ‘Cantorians’, ‘axiomaticians’ and ‘logistics’ and 
confronted his perspective (not yet labelled) with each of them in his dissertation (1907). From the 1911 review 
of the Mannoury volume Methodologisches und Philosophisches zur Elementar-Mathematik Brouwer 
introduced the foundational scene of the last century and divided it into two main parts: the ‘formalists’ 
(including Dedekind, Peano, Russell, Hilbert and Zermelo) and the ‘intuitionists’ (represented by Poincaré and 
Borel). The following year, Brouwer chose the label ‘neo-intuitionism’ for his foundational school, and 
maintained the label ‘formalism’ to indicate all the others. In the 1930 Königsberg conference37 (attended by 
Carnap, Heyting and von Neumann), the label ‘formalism’ was used for the Hilbert school, while the label 
‘logicism’, which appeared (in the foundational context) two years before in the revised edition of the book 
Einleitung in die Mengenlehre by A. Fraenkel, was attributed to the school of Frege-Russell (represented at 
the conference by Carnap). Brouwer didn’t share such a tripartition, and in his later writings he settled on the 
contrast intuitionism-formalism, as given in his 1927 Berliner lectures, where he distinguished two schools: 
Dedekind and Zermelo were old formalists, Hilbert was a new formalist; Poincaré and Lebesgue were pre-
intuitionists, Brouwer himself was an intuitionist. My explanation is that Brouwer, as a founding father, wanted 
to present himself as new and definitive hence he used two labels in order to describe the entire matter as it 
could only be divided into ‘self’ and ‘non-self’: it was a way to focus on his own perspective and to reaffirm 
its trait of absoluteness. 
 
9. Arend Heyting 
Arend Heyting was Brouwer’s pupil, he got his PhD in 1925 with the thesis Intuitionistische Axiomatiek der 
Projectieve Meetkunde (Intuitionistic Axiomatics of Projective Geometry) and took part in the Königsberg 
conference in 1930 as the representative of intuitionism.  
9.1.  Mathematische Grundlagenforschung. Intuitionismus. Beweistheorie 
In his 1934 Mathematische Grundlagenforschung. Intuitionismus Beweistheorie, he showed that he had 
acknowledged the tri-partition of the foundational schools. In particular, at the beginning of the book he 
stressed that three main directions had been designed (gebildet) in the foundations of mathematics: the 
formalist, the intuitionist and ‘die logistische Auffassung’ (1934, p. 1), and described metamathematics as a 
byproduct of logistic, in which formalists were also interested in (1934, pp. 4–5):  
Nach der logistischen Auffassung ist die Mathematik ein Zweig der Logik. Es entstanden so die 
mathematische Probleme, erstens die Logik exakt aufzubauen, zweitens die Mathematik aus der Logik 
wirklich zu entwickeln. An diesen formalen Aufbau schieen sich dann die ‘metamathematischen’ 
Untersuchungen an, in denen der formale Apparat an sich, ohne Rücksicht auf seine inhaltliche 
Bedeutung, auf seine Struktur untersucht wird. Gerade diese metamathematischen Untersuchungen 
                                                     
36 And satisfying the conditions for identity: if they hold for a certain mathematical entity, they should also hold for all 
mathematical entities which have been defined to be equal to it, relations of equality having to be symmetric, reflexive 
and transitive. 
37 About the 1930 conference see Grattan-Guinness 2000, pp. 508–509. 
fangen an, sich zu selbstständigen Disziplinen zu entwickeln. Nach formalistischer Auffassung  ist die 
eigentliche Mathematik rein formaler Art; es wird aber groer Gewicht gelegt auf die 
metamathematische Betrachtung der formalen Mathematik, durch die insbesondere die 
Widerspruchsfreiheit […] des formalen Systems sichergestellt werden soll.  
He did not go into detail in ‘die logistische Aufbau’, because it was Gödel that was in charge of that part of 
the book. At the end Gödel delays so much that publisher and co-author decided to give up his part (see Parsons 
2003, pp. 28–33). The plan of the book38 that Heyting proposed in his first letter was the following (Gödel 
2003, p. 35):  
1. Short historical introduction. (Poincaré); 2. The paradoxes; attempts at resolution apart from the 
three principal directions; 3. The calculus of logic; its further development (Americans); logicism; 4. 
Intuitionism; 5. Formalism; 6. Other standpoints; 7. Relations between the different directions; 8. 
Mathematical and natural science.  
Gödel should have covered the first three chapters, but he tried to re-adjust the distribution. In a draft of a letter 
(VIII 1931) he explained that metamathematics was hardly separable from logistic (‘Logistik’) because 
metamathematics was a theory of the linguistic forms: so he suggested to keep that part for himself, by leaving 
Heyting the formalization of intuitionism (in addition to intuitionism and semi-intuitionism). Later (IX 1931), 
he proposed to deal with metamathematics as an adjoint part to logicism by himself again; in another chapter, 
one of them should have delt with the foundations of formalism (in particular the consistency of the calculus). 
In June 1932 (letter 4), Heyting asked Gödel to write a part on metamathematics: they would have later decided 
whether to insert it in the chapter about logicism39 or, better, in the one  about formalism. In any case, he left 
Gödel a great deal of Poincaré’s criticisms in general, and also suggested to grant him a separate chapter, 
because Poincaré’s criticisms concerned many foundational viewpoints. He himself didn’t want to write that 
part because he felt he didn’t have enough knowledge of Poincaré’s historical background. In letter 5 (also 
written in june 1932), Heyting stated that there were works that delt with formal logic ‘without philosophical 
presuppositions’, for instance American investigations about axiomatics of Boolean algebra, the works of 
Bernays and Schönfinkel, the works about the Entscheidunsproblem, and Hilbert’s ‘Theoretische Logik’. He 
suggested to put them ‘im Anschluss an dem Logizismus’; he also left Gödel the presentation of Chwistek 
(either among the logisticians or in the chapter that collected all other viewpoints) and the relationship between 
logicism and natural sciences (to be inserted in the final chapter). In fact, Gödel did not send his part. Heyting 
took care of the part devoted to both ‘intuitionism’40 and ‘formalism’ (named in the title of the book: 
‘Beweistheorie’) and wrote other two parts about ‘Andere Standpunkte’ and ‘Mathematik und 
Naturwissenschaft’. In ‘Andere Standpunkte’ he affirmed that never had two mathematicians fully agreed 
about that subject; furthermore, at that point in time many philosophers showed interest in foundational items. 
Therefore, a lot of foundational nuances could be listed, and, even if they could be discussed in all of the book, 
the author could not discuss them ‘weil die Argumente eines Philosophen meistens erst in dem Zusammenhang 
seines Systems verständlich sind’ (1934, p.67). Consequently, he briefly quoted Otto Ludwig Hölder (‘sein 
Buch41 […] gelangt aber nicht zu einem eigenen Standpunkt’), Torsten Brodén (‘seine Arbeit42 […] wenigstens 
in mathematischer Hinsicht ernsthafter Kritik nicht gewachsen sein dürfte’) and Julius König (‘entwickelte43 
noch vor Hilbert ein rein formales System […] allerdings ist das formale System sehr wenig umfassend und 
diese Betrachtungen nehmen nur einen sehr kleinen Teil des Buches ein’– 1934, p. 57). Then, he specified that 
in France a school of philosophers had been formed and they considered mathematics from an empirical 
viewpoint,44 and suggested Émile Meyerson’s book Du Cheminement de la Pensée  as a survey of all of them 
                                                     
38 About the personal contacts between Gödel and Heyting see also van Atten and Kennedy 2009, pp. 501–503 and van 
Atten 2015, pp. 191–193. 
39 In the correspondence between the two authors the labels ‘logistic’ and ‘logicism’ were used as interchangeable.  
40 Including the semi-intuitionists Borel, Weyl and Kaufmann. 
41 Hölder 1924. 
42 Brodén 1924. 
43 König 1914. 
44 He added the remark that empirical had to be intended in the common philosophical sense and not in Borel’s sense: 
‘[…] empiristischen Standpunkt (im üblichen philosophischen Sinn, nicht im Sinn Borels)’ (Heyting 1934, p.58). 
(by specifying : ‘der selbst eine Vermittelnde Stellung zwischen Empirismus und Apriorismus einnehmen will’ 
1934, p. 58).  The page devoted to Mannoury had been written by Mannoury himself,45 and at the end Moritz 
Pasch’s so called ‘empirism’46 was quickly described.  
It is interesting to emphasize that Heyting mentioned ‘semi-intuitionists’. 47 As we have mentioned above, we 
find the label ‘semi-intuitionism’ in the Gödel’s letter August 1931 for the first time, where he gave Heyting 
the semi-intuitionistic direction: ‘Was die halbintuitionistische Richtung betrifft (Borel, Weyl ‘Das 
Kontinuum’ etc., so möchte ich gleichfalls vorschlagen, daß sie von Ihnen behandelt wird’ (Gödel 2003, p. 
36). Then, we find such label in the final version of the book: in the first part of the book (committed to 
intuitionism), the first chapter is dedicated to Poincarè’s influence and the second to ‘Die franzoesischen 
Halbintuitionisten’. Two further (short) chapters are dedicated to Weyl resp. and to Kaufmann before the 
beginning of the longest chapter, obviously committed to Brouwer. We see that Heyting did not insert Weyl 
among the semi-intuitionists as Gödel had suggested. Heyting defined the essence of ‘intuitionism’ as the 
belief in two ‘Grundsaetze’: 1) mathematics has also a contenutistic meaning (‘inhaltliche Bedeutung’); 2) 
mathematical objects are directly grasped by a thinking spirit (‘denkenden Geist’), therefore, mathematical 
knowledge is independent of experience (‘Erfahrung’). Poincaré was described as a forerunner of intuitionists 
because he thought that mathematical induction had a content and ‘forced us with necessity’; still he was only 
a forerunner and not a complete intuitionist, because he assigned to consistency proofs the value of proofs of 
existence of mathematical objects (like Hilbert). Then, Heyting specified that there were some authors who, 
referring to the second Grundsatz of intuitionism, believed that mathematical objects had an autonomous 
existence but they would only recognize them after building the objects. Such viewpoint was called by him 
‘Halb-intuitionism’ (1934, p. 4). He stated that many authors shared such belief: Kronecker, Borel, Lebesgue, 
Baire, Kaufmann, Skolem, Richard. He committed the following chapter to French intuitionists, by calling 
them also ‘Empiristen’, according to Borel’s self-definition as ‘empiriste ou réaliste’ (Borel 1928, p. 169). 
Heyting stressed that the above mentioned authors shared such belief, but then had very different viewpoints: 
for instance, Hadamard could have been called ‘idealist’ and Baire ‘realist’. 
Therefore, we can state that in his 1934 Mathematische Grundlagenforschung. Intuitionismus. Beweistheorie, 
Heyting showed that he acknowledged the tri-partition of the foundational schools, but at the same time he 
showed oscillation in terminology, an openness about the possibility of other schools and doubts in attaching 
labels to research projects. 
9.2. ‘Spanningen in de wiskunde’ 
In his 1949 inaugural address ‘Spanningen in de wiskunde’ (‘Tensions in Mathematics’), Heyting described a 
formal attitude in the foundations of mathematics which Frege tried to do and Hilbert bettered. He did not use 
either ‘logistic’ or ‘logicism’ to distinguish them. He affirmed that the axiomatic method (that accompanied 
our history from Euclid on) could not give a foundation for mathematics, because axioms themselves required 
a justification. Therefore, axiomatics put the foundational questions and answered in formalistic terms: ‘Hilbert 
is dan vrij spoedig tot een formalistisch stanpunt gekomen (Hilbert arrived quite soon to a formalistic 
standpoint)’ (1949, p. 9). He added that Frege had already reached a formalistic construction of mathematics, 
in which mathematics was considered a part of logic. His system had produced antinomies, therefore Hilbert 
constructed his own, by keeping logic and mathematics in parallel in the same system, looking for a proof of 
non-contradictoriness. Gödel proved that such proof could not be found inside the system itself or in a weaker 
one. In the meantime, Brouwer had given an intuitionistic foundation of mathematics. Yet, many intuitionistic 
                                                     
45 Mannoury expressed his point of view both relativist and pragmatist (as in 1909). He added the necessity of a 
preliminary significist analysis before considering foundations of mathematics. He depicted his own position as an attempt 
to conciliate intuitionism and logicism (Heyting 1934, pp. 65–66). 
46 Heyting stressed (1934, p.59) that Pasch himself chose the label ‘empirism’, although in a sense different from the 
usual one. Pasch stated that mathematics should refer to sensible experience and point both its Kernbegriffe and its 
Kernsätze out of it, by paying attention that the Kerngebriffe be so clear to avoid any misunderstanding and the Kernsätze 
express experiences (‘Erfahrungstatsachen’) simple enough to be tested by anybody in his/her daily life. 
47 About the use of the labels ‘semi’/’pre-intuitionism’ for Poincaré, Borel and Lebesgue in Brouwer see Michel 2008. 
About Poincaré’s influence on ‘contemporary intuitionists’ supposed by Heyting see Heinzmann and Nabonnand 2008. 
notions appeared not to be so clear in the eyes of other intuitionists48 (1949, p. 13): ‘Aan verschillende delen 
van de intuitionistische wiskunde komt dus een verschillende grad van evidentie toe (to different parts of 
intuitionistic mathematics belong different degrees of evidence)’.  
He stressed that no foundational viewpoint is exempt from criticisms, and each of them left many philosophical 
questions. According to him (1949, p. 17), the best solution was a method  
die hed midden houdt tussen die van de vakwiskundigen en die van de filosofen, namelijk deze, dat men 
tracht, zich het wiskundige denkproces zo zuiver en helder mogelijk tot bewustzijn te brengen, zonder 
er bepaalde metaphysische of psychologische interpretaties van te geven (that is halfway between that 
of the specialist disciplines and that of philosophers, i.e. this, that one tries to bring to consciousness the 
mathematical process as pure and clear as possible, without giving certain metaphysical or psychological 
interpretations. 
We should take mathematics as it was, without idealizing it. In particular, intuitionistic mathematics was an 
‘activity of the spirit’ (‘geestelijke activiteit’) to which many people contributed, and they communicated both 
through the daily language and symbolic language. At the end he asked if (and why) intuitionistic mathematics 
was worthwhile. He doubted that it could be useful in natural sciences, yet, if intuitionism were put in a fruitful 
relationship (‘vruchtbare wisselwerking’) with other forms of thought ‘denkvormen’, then high results were to 
be expected in both the logic and the theory of knowledge (‘kentheoretici’). Heyting questioned worthiness, 
by keeping as an alternative the ‘klassieke school’. This expression explains why he only used two labels 
‘formalism’ and ‘intuitionism’: he saw intuitionistic mathematics (and logic) as very different from the earlier 
unique mathematics (and logic). Therefore, he considered only two contrasting groups: the ancient (where the 
foundational question begun and had been answered in formalistic terms) and the new (intuitionism). 
9.3. ‘Sur la Tâche de la Philosophie des Mathématiques’ 
In ‘Sur la Tâche de la Philosophie des Mathématiques’ (1953) he spoke of ‘partisans de la logistiques’, 
‘mathématiciens croient que la rigueur ne se trouve que dans la manipulation de formules’ and ‘les 
intuitionnistes’ as ‘les courants de pensée plus modernes’, but at the end of the paper he made a comparison 
only between the viewpoints of intuitionists and of formalists as representing (at a deeper insight) the two 
aspects which classical mathematics consisted of. He suggested, as a task for the philosopher of science, to 
point out that both the formalists and the intuitionists just developed one aspect of classical mathematics; they 
could not stand by themselves, separated by one another, but they both took care of aspects, none of which 
could be detached from mathematics (1953, p. 197):  
Un mathématicien formaliste écrit des formules suivant des règles clairement formulées, mais le 
philosophe portera son attention également sur les judgements de valeur que le formaliste fait sur son 
système, et sur l’intérpretation tacite qui le guide dans la construction du système. De même, quand 
l’intuitionniste pretend s’interesser exclusivement aux constructions mentales, le philosophe observera 
qu’il fait tout de même des calculs formels et se demandera quel est le role du calcul dans la conception 
intuitionniste (A formalist mathematician writes formulas according to clearly formulated rules, but the 
philosopher will also focus on the value judgements that the formalist expresses in his system, and on 
the tacit interpretation that guides him in the construction of the system. Similarly, when the intuitionist 
pretends to be interested exclusively in mental constructions, the philosopher will remark that he himself 
has made formal calculations and wonders what is the role of the calculation inside the intuitionistic 
viewpoint). 
9.4. Intuitionism: an Introduction 
In his 1956 Intuitionism: an Introduction, at the very beginning Heyting proposed a dialogue between a 
classical logician, a formalist, an intuitionist, a ‘letteralist’, a pragmatist, a representant of the Signific. The 
dialogue was centered around the possible criticisms to intuitionism, but the criticisms were expressed by well 
                                                     
48 See Griss’ criticism of the notion of negation (Franchella 1994) for instance. 
specified ‘sources’ that – in some cases – also described their own opinion.  No ‘logicist’ appeared under this 
label. A strong hint of Carnap was apparent, and he was directly quoted but under the label ‘formalism’. The 
classicist pointed out the following criticisms: 
1) Intuitionistic mathematics could not be seen as the whole mathematics but only as a part of classical 
mathematics.49 
2) Intuitionistic mathematics believed to do without logic, but it built castles in the air if it would not have 
the firm ground that only logic could offer.50 
3) Intuitionistic mathematics presented ‘truths’ that were not absolute (i.e. eternal, valid in any time), but that 
began to be valid at the moment in which, for instance, a certain object was built by satisfying a given 
property.51 
The letteralist defined his viewpoint about mathematics: ‘Mathematics is quite a simple thing. I define some 
signs and I give some rules for combining them; that is all’. He did not need proof of consistency for their 
formal systems because these were directly confronted with applications and in general they proved to be 
useful. This would be ‘difficult to explain if every formula were deducible in them’ (1956, p. 7). He criticized 
intuitionism for the following reasons: 
1) Intuitionism accepted the infinite in mathematics (even if in its potential form), but clarity could be reached 
only by remaining in the finite.52 
2) Intuitionism had a dogmatic character because it accepted some principles (for instance, complete 
induction) and refused some others (for instance, the principle of excluded middle), even if most people 
considered all of them as evident.53 
3) Intuitionism had a ‘theological character’ because mathematical intuition inspired it with objective and 
eternal truths.54 
The significist criticized intuitionism for its reluctance towards formalization, which was the ideal of the 
modern scientist and was, according to him, the only access to mental constructions.55 
The pragmatist agreed with the significists and added: ‘The ideal of modern scientist is to prepare an arsenal 
of formal systems ready for use from which he can choose, for any theory, that system which correctly 
represents the experimental results’. 
 The formalist criticized intuitionism for the following reasons: 
1) Neither terms nor derivation rules were well defined: therefore, the risk of misunderstanding was high.56 
                                                     
49 Heyting replied that intuitionistic mathematics had a different object with respect to classical mathematics. In any case, 
he was open to recognizing the existence of different possible objects for different mathematics. He did not intend to 
consider intuitionistic mathematics as an absolute. 
50 Heyting stressed that also logic itself would need a firm ground at its turn. 
51 Heyting answered that believing in something that had not yet been constructed would involve a series of metaphysical 
difficulties that could be avoided only by banishing such ‘entities’ from mathematics (1956, p.3) 
52 Heyting pointed out that even children in the elementary school could understand what the natural numbers were and 
they accepted the fact that the sequence of natural numbers could be indefinitely continued (1956, p. 7). He did not claim 
certainty or definiteness in absolute sense – which would be unrealizable – but he contended that it was sufficiently clear 
to build mathematics upon. 
53 Heyting underlined that ‘evidence’ meant ‘mental construction’, which anybody was supposed to be able to carry on.  
54 Heyting rebutted that intuitionistic mathematics had to do with mental constructions and everybody were convinced 
that other people could build mental constructions analogous to our own. 
55 Heyting admitted that, if the trend of science would really be the formalization of language, then intuitionistic 
mathematics did not belong to mathematics in this sense of the word, but it would rather be a natural activity of man. Yet, 
it seemed to him that usefulness was not the only measure of value. For instance, an artistic product would be highly 
valued, although in most cases it was useless.  
56 Here Heyting did not answer directly, but he affirmed that they both were interested to that type of reasoning that 
appeared in metamathematics and they specifically limited themselves to it because they were deeply convicted that ‘we 
find here one of the most fundamental faculties of the human mind’ (1956, p.4).  
2) It destroyed a large part of classical mathematics.57 
It is very interesting that the intuitionist stated at the very beginning (1956, p. 1) that mental mathematical 
constructions were objects that required their ‘own’ logic, i.e. intuitionistic logic. We can interpret this as an 
application of Carnap’s principle of tolerance. Heyting referred to it later, by letting it be quoted by the so 
called formalist. In particular, when the intuitionist affirmed that the difference between formalists and 
intuitionists was mainly one of tastes, the formalist replied:58 ‘If you will not quarrel with formalism, neither 
will I with intuitionism. Formalists are among the most pacific of mankind. Any theory may be formalized and 
then becomes subject to our methods. Also intuitionistic mathematics may and will be treated’ (1956, p. 4). 
The direct reference to Carnap 1934 and 1937 was put inside this quote.59 
It is useful to compare this reference to the difference between intuitionists and formalists as a matter of taste 
with the same reference mentioned above in Brouwer 1928. Brouwer’s reference was ‘under condition’: if 
(and only if) the formalists accepted his four conditions, then the difference between the two schools would 
have become a matter of taste. Such conditions would have changed the essence of the formalist viewpoint: 
there wouldn’t be any differences between them and the matter of taste would not have concerned the 
acceptance of a viewpoint (instead of another) but simply the choice of a label (instead of another) for the same 
viewpoint.  
9.5. ‘Blick von der intuitionistischen Warte’ and ‘On Truth in Mathematics’ 
In 1958 Heyting published ‘Blick von der intuitionistischen Warte’ and ‘On Truth in Mathematics’. In the first 
paper he stated that classical mathematics was a ‘merkwürdige Mischung sehr heterogener Bestandteile’ 
(1958a, p. 338). Intuitionism and formalism had pointed out two of those aspects, i.e. the formal side and the 
part that was based on number-intuition. They were in error when each believed to be ‘die einzig Richtige’:  
formal mathematics always contains a remnant of intuition, while the intuitionistic cannot do without the use 
of formulas. Still, there was a third direction, the platonistic one, consisting in the belief in the existence of a 
world of mathematical objects. It was refused by the first two directions; nevertheless, the majority of 
mathematicians insisted on this conception; they use the classical proof procedures without considering them 
as purely formal developments. 
In ‘On truth in mathematics’ he presented a tripartition of classical mathematics again, by specifying that the 
component that he ‘should like to call the naïve, but which was often called the platonic one’ (1958b, p. 277) 
was shared by the mathematicians until 1900s, then it was put in doubt by the discovery of paradoxes, by 
Hilbert and by Brouwer. According to Heyting, the assumption of an abstract reality of any sort was 
                                                     
57 Heyting replied that mutilations of mathematics could be seen as the excision of noxious ornaments and they were 
however partly compensated for by the charm of subtle distinctions that intuitionists had introduced (1956, p. 11). 
58 Maybe Heyting put Carnap’s quotes in the mouth of the formalist, because he considered Carnap’s position essentially 
different from logicism just in reason of his principle of tolerance: while logicism believes in only one logic, Carnap 
presented a catalogue of possible logics. Carnap style is also traceable in the criticism that the intuitionist did to the 
classicist during the debate about the meaning of ‘existence’ in mathematics by stating: ‘Your argument is metaphysical 
in nature’. He did not exclude metaphysics as such, but only in the practice of mathematics (1956, p. 2):  
We have no objection against a mathematician privately admitting any metaphysical theory he likes, but Brouwer’s 
program entails that we study mathematics as something simpler, more immediate than metaphysics. In the study 
of mental mathematical constructions ‘to exist’ must be synonymous with ‘to be constructed’. […] In fact all 
mathematicians and even intuitionists are convinced that in some sense mathematics bears upon eternal truths, but 
when trying to define precisely this sense, one gets entangled in a maze of metaphysical difficulties. The only way 
to avoid them is to banish them from mathematics.  
Carnap was quoted also as a reference for the formalist’s criticism on the purpose of vagueness of definitions. It is 
interesting to stress that on the quoted page Carnap (1934, p.41) had labelled Poincaré, Brouwer, Weyl, Heyting, Becker, 
Kaufmann and Wittgenstein as ‘strict finitists’. Heyting didn’t use that label because he described the position of the 
‘letteralist’ as strict finitist and put the name of Curry under that label (1956, p. 8). 
59 ‘[…] das Toleranzprinzip: wir wollen nicht Verbote aufstellen, sondern Festsetzungen treffen. […] In der Logik gibt 
es keine Moral.  Jeder mag seine Logik, d.h.  seine Sprachform aufbauen wie er will’ (1934, pp. 44–45). 
meaningless, yet ‘It seems to be increasing nowadays, under the influence of the successes of the semantic 
school, under the leadership of Tarski’ (1958b, p. 278). 
9.6. ‘After thirty years’ 
In 1962, as we expect from the title ‘After thirty years’, Heyting referred to the Königsberg Conference, hence 
he mentioned logicism, by stressing that in 1931 logicism had to solve more of a technical problem than one 
of fundamental nature (1962, p. 194), i.e. eliminating the axiom of reducibility without adopting Ramsey’s 
Platonism. Then, he discussed both logicism and formalism in a few words (1923, p. 195):  
None of the conceptions of mathematics is today as clear-cut as it was in 1930. I shall be short about 
formalism and logicism. Formalism is the least vulnerable, but for metamathematical work it needed 
some form of intuitive mathematics. As to logicism, many axiomatic systems of logic and of set theory 
compete. It has proved not to be intuitively clear what is intuitively clear in mathematics. It is even 
possible to construct a descending scale of grades of evidence. 
Finally, he committed himself only to intuitionism. He added that ‘intuitive, formal, logical and platonic’ 
elements inside mathematics had been recognized.  
9.7. ‘Wijsbegeerte de Wiskunde’ 
In his 1968 paper ‘Wijsbegeerte de Wiskunde’ (‘Philosophy of Mathematics’), Heyting offered a review that 
started from Cantor and Frege, included Hilbert and Brouwer but also Mannoury and a brief reference to E.W. 
Beth. He considered Cantor and Frege inside a unique chapter under the title ‘Set theory and logic’, stressing 
that Frege’s Begriffe (concepts) corresponded to Cantor’s sets. Heyting mentioned Frege’s logicism and the 
paradoxes that affected it. He stated that, even if both Russell and Quine solved them, there could be no 
warranty that some other paradox could emerge. This was the question that Hilbert had already done in 1900 
at the Paris congress (Hilbert 1900b) in his list of the mathematical problems to solve in the twentieth century: 
is there a proof that mathematics and logic are consistent? Therefore, Heyting delt with Hilbert’s way to handle 
that problem in the following chapter. As for Mannoury, Heyting stressed his engagement in signific and 
referred that the movement analysed the ‘taaldaden’ (‘linguistic facts’), consisting of two meanings, that of the 
speaker and that of the hearer. The first were thought and emotions that the speaker wanted to transmit; the 
latter were the effects of the first. Heyting recalled two concepts of the signific analysis that seemed to be of 
substantial relevance to him: 1) ‘taaldualiteit’, i.e. the distinction between indicative and volitional elements 
of the meaning, which were expressed resp. in the ‘het-taal’ (‘it-language’) and in the ‘ik-taal’ (‘I-language’); 
2) ‘taalpolariteit’ (‘the polarity of language’), consisting of the particular and the limited on the one side, and 
of the general and the universal on the other side (1968, p. 147). A confusion of elements of het-taal and ik-
taal should be avoided. Many problems came out in philosophy on the basis of this confusion (for instance, 
the question ‘what is the aim of the world’ mixed up ‘world’ that belonged to the het-taal and ‘aim’ that 
belonged to the ik-taal). Heyting saw in this a similarity with neopositivism but ‘without limiting language to 
communicating only the scientific results’; 3) the scale of languages according to the relevance that syntactical 
relations gained. The top took place in formalised languages, like formalised mathematics (or logic),60 that had 
neither an indicative nor an emotional meaning: it fell outside the duality of language, while in the polarity of 
language it was collocated on the universal side. The passage from one level to another was always gradual. 
Mannoury considered impossible to found mathematics on an absolutely sure ground. Finally, Heyting 
explained the two significist ways of observing the mathematical language: the analytical way (consisting in 
observing the forms of language and the psychological associations linked to them that should be counted to 
mathematics in order to characterise it at best) and the synthetic way (consisting in putting conditions that a 
mathematical language has to satisfy and then trying to develop such a language). In no case a definitive result 
                                                     
60 Heyting also referred to Mannoury’s distinction between choice-negation (that took place between two oppositions – 
cold/hot) and exclusion negation (that did not propose an alternative, like the negation present in the concept of infinite) 
(1968, p. 148). 
could be obtained, because it depended on the conscious and unconscious associations that were outside 
mathematics. 
As for Beth, he stressed that his philosophy of mathematics was more a program than a complete theorization, 
consisting of a conceptual realism that distinguished four spheres of reality (the physical reality – the world of 
matter; the social reality – the world of men; the subjective reality – the world of the spirit; the logical reality 
– the world of ‘redenering’). Mathematics would belong to the last sphere. Heyting also recalled Beth’s 
methodology: the critical research (‘onderzoek’) of concepts and methods of science, both ‘van binnen uit’ 
(i.e. of the science from the inner, as the science is) and ‘van buiten’ (‘from the outside’), through a general 
philosophy. His work in logic and philosophy of mathematics was a part of the first kind of analysis. Heyting 
stressed that the author himself had admitted that a lot of work was still necessary before getting to a 
‘filosofische synthese’ (1968, p. 151).  
9.8. ‘Intuitionistic Views about the Nature of Mathematics’ 
In 1974, in presenting intuitionistic views about mathematics, Heyting wrote only about intuitionism and 
formalism by stating that intuitionism described mathematical thought while formalism could only offer a 
linguistic structure. He specified that, looking for a basis of mathematics which ‘is directly given and which 
we can immediately understand without philosophical subtleties’ (1974, p. 80), the first which presented itself 
was the process of counting. An analysis of it led us to the simplest function of our mind:  isolating an object. 
In reality, – Heyting said – we do not isolate objects but perceptions: ‘I can fix my attention on a certain 
impression, in most cases visual’ (1974, p. 80).61 By creating an entity, another entity, still another entity, etc., 
we mentally construct natural numbers. It is clear that all conscious thinking can be considered as applied 
mathematics. As soon as numerals were introduced, people learnt to abstract from the content of the 
perceptions which were isolated and to consider them as pure entities. Heyting was conscious that some 
problems arose when people tried to communicate their mental constructions to others: he affirmed that we 
can only be sure when referring to small natural numbers. In this context he compared intuitionism to ‘the 
most radical form of formalism’, that he described in the following way (1974, p. 89):  
The formalist considers every intuitive mathematical reasoning as inexact. He studies the language in 
which such reasonings are expressed and tries to formalize them. The result is a formal system consisting 
of a finite number of symbols and a finite number of rules for combining them into formulas. 
 The result of the comparison was (Ibidem): 
There is no conflict between intuitionism and formalism when each keeps to its own subject, intuitionism 
to mental constructions, formalism to the construction of a formal system, motivated by its internal 
beauty or by its utility for science and industry. They clash when formalists contend that their systems 
express mathematical thought. Intuitionists make two objections against this contention. In the first 
place, as I have argued, just now, mental constructions cannot be rendered exactly by means of language; 
secondly the usual interpretation of the formal system is untenable as a mental construction.  
In this perspective, logic would be either a part of mathematics (if we interpreted syllogisms in term of set 
theory) or applied mathematics (if we interpreted syllogisms in terms of truth-value of linguistic expressions). 
The paper ended with a gradualist vision of the various aspects of culture. At the lowest (and commonest) level 
there was the creation of a finite number of individual entities and the relations between them. The 
mathematical systems used in modern physics were enormously more refined than those that were at the basis 
of history, but also the work of the historian consisted in establishing relations between the facts that he had 
isolated in the continuous stream of events. 
                                                     
61 Heyting specified (1974, p. 80):  
When we think, we think in entities. This does not mean that all our mental life consists of thinking in entities. On 
the contrary, the more intensely we live, the less we think in isolated entities. Under the influence of strong 
emotions the world seems a whole, loaded with emotion. Only after the emotions are soothed we map out aims 
and ways to attain them. 
 9.9. ‘History of the Foundations of Mathematics’ 
In ‘History of the Foundations of Mathematics’ of 1978, which covered a time spread till 1940, Heyting 
described the basic steps of the subject (formalization of logic, the paradoxes of set theory, type theory, proof 
theory) and the so-called ‘dramatic events’ (the discovery of Russell’s paradox and Gödel’s theorems); at the 
end, he presented the three Dutch figures of Brouwer, with two final chapters committed to intuitionistic topics 
(choice sequences and ‘the continuum as a spread’), Beth, and Mannoury (both of them very briefly). As for 
Beth, he recalled his main contributions to logic, i.e. Beth’s theorem (the theorem ‘on the reduction in a formal 
system of an implicit definition to an explicit definition’) and the method of semantic tableaux (1978, p. 6). 
As for Mannoury, he only specified that his personal philosophy was that of Significs, based on psychological 
investigation of linguistic intercourse, and that it led him to a relativistic opinion that doubted even 
mathematical exactness. Heyting added (1978, p. 15) some remarks about his own contributions:  
My papers on the formalization of intuitionistic logic and mathematics  […] I regret that my name is 
known to-day mainly in connection with these papers […] They diverted the attention from the 
underlying ideas to the formal system itself’.  
He concluded (1978, p. 15) with his observations about the situation of intuitionism at that time:  
The editors of this collection decided to delimit it to the years before 1940. Still I cannot end without 
remarking that afterwards the situation has completely changed. It is generally recognised that 
intuitionism makes sense and that it is worthwhile to study it. The controversy between intuitionism and 
formalism has been solved. Dutch workers on foundations are no longer isolated; they collaborate 
intensively with their colleagues all over the world. 
9.10. Final remarks 
It is clear from all these quotes that Heyting firmly believed that intuitionism was the right foundation of 
mathematics. Yet, he was very respectful of other opinions and believed that collaboration amongst 
mathematicians was highly relevant. He was open to new ideas, new results and new projects. Furthermore, it 
is also clear from the analysis of all his foundational papers that Heyting did not see the foundational schools 
as three clear–cut stones, but in the foundational panorama he examined many suggestions that could have 
been or could not have been suitable for existing labels. The suggestions could be presented under the name 
of the proponent or under an old label or a newly coined one. I think that these two aspects (openness to others’ 
points of view and freedom in labelling) were linked: his frequent changes in presenting the foundational 
schools, his description of a broad range of them and his freedom in labelling were signs of his openness 
towards other points of view and of his will to avoid rigid contrapositions among them.  By contrast, Brouwer’s 
constant use of only two labels to describe the foundational panorama was a sign of his will to absolutize his 
viewpoint: all the possible nuances of other perspectives were collected under a unique label in the perspective 
of a final duel that should have led to a definitive victory. 
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